We describe a general model,`experience-weighted attraction' EWA learning, which includes reinforcement learning and a class of weighted ctitious play belief models as special cases. In EWA, strategies have attractions which re ect prior predispositions, are updated based on payo experience, and determine choice probabilities according to some rule e.g., logit. A key feature is a parameter which weights the strength of hypothetical reinforcement of strategies which were not chosen according to the payo they would have yielded. When = 0 c hoice reinforcement results. When = 1 , l e v els of reinforcement of strategies are proportional to expected payo s given beliefs based on past history. Another key feature is the growth rates of attractions. The EWA model controls the growth rates by two decay parameters, and , which depreciate attractions and amount of experience separately. When = , belief-based models result; when = 0 choice reinforcement results.
Colin Camerer
Teck-Hua Ho The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania How does an equilibrium arise in a noncooperative game? While it is conceivable that players reason their way to an equilibrium, a more psychologically plausible view is that players adapt or evolve toward it. 1 The urry of recent research on adaptation and evolution mostly explores theoretical questions, like which types of equilibria speci c evolutionary or adaptive rules converge to. We are interested in a fundamentally empirical question: Which models describe human behavior best? In this paper we propose a general`experience-weighted attraction' EWA model and estimate the model parametrically, using three sets of experimental data.
The EWA model combines elements of two seemingly di erent approaches, and includes them as special cases. One approach, belief-based models, start with the premise that players keep track of the history of previous play by other players and form some belief about what others will do in the future based on past observation. Then they tend to choose a best-response, a strategy which maximizes their expected payo s given the beliefs they formed.
A di erent approach, choice reinforcement, assumes that strategies are`reinforced' by their previous payo s, and the propensity to choose a strategy depends in some way on its stock of reinforcement. Players who learn by reinforcement do not generally have beliefs about what other players will do. They care only about the payo s strategies yielded in the past, not about the history of play that created those payo s.
The belief and reinforcement approaches have been treated as fundamentally di erent since the 1950s. Until recently, nobody asked whether the two might be related, or how. But like two rivers with a surprising common source, or children raised apart who turn out to besiblings, belief and reinforcement are special kinds of one learning model. We suspect that the common heritage of these approaches was not discovered earlier because the information used by each approach is so di erent. Belief-based models do not specially re ect past successes reinforcements of chosen strategies. Reinforcement models do not re ect the history of how others played. The EWA approach includes both as special cases by incorporating both kinds of information, using three modelling features.
The crucial feature is how strategies are reinforced. In the choice reinforcement approach, when player 1 picks strategy s i 1 reinforced at all. In EWA, the unchosen strategies are reinforced based on a multiple of the payo s 1 s k 1 ; s j 2 they would have earned. This makes psychological sense because research on human and animal learning shows that people learn from experiences other than those which are directly reinforcing. This expanded notion of reinforcement therefore liberates choice reinforcement from the limits of behaviorist psychology, t o ward something more cognitive and descriptive of humans.
The second feature controls the growth rates of attractions. Attractions are numbers that are monotonically related to the probability o f c hoosing a strategy. In reinforcement models attractions can grow and grow, which implies that convergence can besharper in the sense that choice probabilities diverge toward one and zero. In belief learning, attractions are expected payo s, which are always bounded by the range of matrix payo s. The EWA model allows growth rates to vary between these two bounds by using separate decay rates, for past attractions, and for the amount of experience which normalizes attractions.
The third modelling feature is initial attraction and experience weight. In belief models initial attractions must beexpected payo s given prior beliefs. In reinforcement models initial attractions are usually unrestricted. Therefore, initial attractions are unrestricted in EWA too. The initial experience weight N0 re ects a strength of prior in belief models, or the relative weight given to lagged attractions versus payo s when attractions are updated. When = 0, = 0, and N0 = 1, the EWA attractions of strategies are equal to reinforcements, as used in many models. When = 1 and = and initial attractions are determined by prior beliefs, the attractions of strategies are equal to their expected payo s given beliefs in a general class. That is, reinforcing each strategy according to what it would have earned or did earn is behaviorally equivalent to forming beliefs, based on observed history, and calculating expected payo s. The equivalence holds because looking back at what strategies earned or would have in the past is the same as forming beliefs based on what others did in the past, then computing forward-looking expected payo s based on those backward-looking beliefs.
EWA tries to mix appropriate elements of reinforcement and belief learning approaches in a way which makes sense. We think this can be judged by whether the parameters have clear psychological interpretations, and whether adding them improves statistical t adjusting, of course, for added degrees of freedom and predictive accuracy. To test the empirical usefulness of EWA, we derived maximum-likelihood parameter estimates from three data sets. The data sets span a wide range of games: Constant-sum games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria; coordination games with multiple Paretoranked equilibria; and`p-beauty contests' with unique dominance-solvable equilibria. Some empirical studies have evaluated belief and reinforcement models, but most have not compared them directly with statistical tests. Because EWA is a generalization which reduces to belief and reinforcement learning when parameters have certain values, it is easy to compare them to EWA and to each other.
In the next section, the EWA approach is de ned and we show how a general class of choice reinforcement and adaptive belief-based approaches are special cases. The third section provides interpretations of the model parameters and discusses how they relate to principles of human learning. The fourth section describes previous ndings and shows how our empirical implementation goes further than earlier work. The fth section reports parameter estimates from several data sets. The last section concludes and mentions some future research directions.
The Experience-weighted Attraction EWA Model
We start with notation. We study n-person normal-form games. Players are indexed by i i = 1 ; : : : ; n , and the strategy space of player i, S i consists of m i discrete choices, that is, ; s m i i g. S = S 1 : : : S n is the Cartesian product of the individual strategy spaces and is the strategy space of the game. s i 2 S i denotes a strategy of player i, and is therefore an element o f S i . s = s 1 ; : : : ; s n 2 S is a strategy combination, and it consists of n strategies, one for each player. s ,i = s 1 ; : : : ; s i,1 ; s i+1 ; : : : ; s n is a strategy combination of all players except i. S ,i has a cardinality of m ,i = n j=1;j6 =i m j . The scalar-valued payo function of player i is i s i ; s ,i . Denote the actual strategy chosen by player i in period t by s i t, and the strategy vector chosen by all other players by s ,i t. Denote player i's payo in a period t by i s i t; s ,i t.
EWA assumes each a strategy has a numerical attraction, which determines the probability of choosing that strategy in a precise way made clear below. Learning models require a speci cation of initial attractions, how attractions are updated by experience, and how choice probabilities depend on attractions. 3 
The EWA updating rules
The core of the EWA model is two variables which are updated after each round. The rst variable is Nt, which we interpret as the number of`observation-equivalents' of past experience. The second variable is A j i t, player i's attraction of strategy j after period t has taken place.
The variables Nt and A j i t begin with some prior values, N0 and A j i 0. These prior values can bethought of as re ecting pregame experience, either due to learning transferred from di erent games or due to introspection. Then N0 can be interpreted as the number of periods of actual experience which is equivalent in attraction impact to the pregame thinking.
Updating is governed by two rules. First,
The parameter is a depreciation rate or retrospective discount factor that measures the fractional impact of previous experience, compared to one new period. The factor is a discount factor or decay rate, which depreciates previous attraction.
Choice reinforcement
In early reinforcement models and some recent ones choice probabilities are updated directly e.g., Bush and Mosteller, 1955; cf. Cross, 1983 . In more recent models It is easy to see that this updating formula is a special case of the EWA rule, when = 0 , N0 = 1, and = 0 . Thus, choice reinforcement in this form is a special case of experience-weighted attraction learning. 3 
Belief-based Models
In a belief-based model, players tend to choose strategies which have high expected payo s given beliefs formed by observing the history of what others did. While there are many ways of forming beliefs, we consider a fairly large class of weighted ctitious play models, which include familiar ones like ctitious play Cournot 1960 2 In the Cross model, strategies have utilities which are weighted averages of past utilities and current payo s for chosen strategies, and players maximize utility. Sarin 1995 shows that when the weight on current payo declines over time, this model behaves similarly to the Harley version in which attractions grow. The similarity re ects the fact that both models build in a declining e ect of marginal reinforcements. 3 Some reinforcement models add other parameters. Roth and Erev 1995 add a parameter which cuts o attractions close to zero, to avoid negative attractions. Erev and Roth 1997 add three parameters which allow reinforcement to depend on payo s minus an updated reference point as in Bush and Mosteller, 1955; Cross, 1983 , where the updating may be di erent for losses and gains. They also add a parameter which smears a portion of the chosen-strategy reinforcement to neighboring strategies, to re ect a kind of experimentation or generalization which is locally similar to our parameter. Camerer and Ho 1998 compare the local-generalization speci cation with updating in the EWA model and nd that local-generalization ts much w orse.
best-response as special cases see Fudenberg and Levine, 1995; Cheung and Friedman, 1997. 4 In the weighted ctitious play model, prior beliefs of opponents' strategy combinations are expressed as a ratio of hypothetical counts of observations of strategy combination s k ,i , denoted by N k ,i 0. These observations can then be naturally integrated with actual observations as experience accumulates. Carnap 1962 shows an elegant set of axioms which implies this structure, which corresponds to Bayesian updating with a Dirichletdistributed prior. In our view, specifying prior beliefs and computing initial expected payo s based on the prior is a crucial feature of belief models, though some papers have not imposed this assumption. Without specifying a prior, there is no guarantee that the updated beliefs which result from mixing initial expected payo s with later experience will bevalid beliefs i.e., nonnegative probabilities which sum to one.
We also allow past experience to be depreciated or discounted by a factor presumably between zero and one. Formally, the prior beliefs for player i about choices of others are speci ed by a v ector of relative frequencies of choices of strategies s k ,i , denoted N k ,i 0. Call the sum of those frequencies dropping the player subscript for simplicity Nt = P m ,i k=1 N k ,i t. When the description` ctitious play' is used below, we mean traditional ctitious play in which all past observations are weighted equally. Also, Camerer and Ho 1998 estimate models in which varies across periods, which generalizes weighted ctitious play to include cases where the weight rises or falls over time. Allowing a time-varying weight does not improve t m uch, so assuming a xed seems reasonable.
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This form of belief updating weights observations from one period ago times as much as the most recent observation. This includes Cournot dynamics = 0 ; only the most recent observation counts and ctitious play = 1; all observations count equally as special cases. The general case 0 1 is a compromise in which all observations count but more recent observations count more. This equation makes the kinship between EWA and belief approaches transparent. Formally, suppose initial attractions are equal to expected payo s given initial beliefs which arise from the`experience-equivalent' strategy counts N k ,i 0, so A j i 0 = E j i 0 = P m ,i k=1 i s j i ; s k ,i B k ,i 0. Then substituting = 1 and = into the attraction updating equation 2 gives attractions which are exactly the same as updated expected payo s in 9. Hence, the weighted belief models are a special case of EWA.
The close relation between reinforcement and belief learning is surprising because the two approaches have generally been treated as fundamentally di erent e.g., Selten, 1991, p 14. However, some connection between reinforcement and belief learning was recognized very recently by others unbeknownst to us. Fudenberg and Levine 1995, pp. 1084-1085 and Cheung and Friedman 1997, p. 54-55 both pointed out that expected payo s computed using ctitious play beliefs, and based on history, are asymptotically the same as histories of actual payo s. But their arguments are based on long-run asymptotic equivalence between a distribution possible payo s and a sample from it actual payo s. Neither seemed to explicitly recognize that even in the short run, there is an exact equivalence between a special kind of reinforcement learning EWA and weighted ctitious play. 5 5 For example, Cheung and Friedman 1997 make their point b y "assum ing for the moment v ery counterfactually!, that the player somehow managed to play both strategies each period". Then "dropping the counterfactual", they show that the average experienced payo s will correspond, up to some noise, to expected payo s. Counterfactual simulation of foregone payo s is precisely the mental process invoked by in EWA. However, the`noise' is correlated with past observations which are included explicitly in EWA, so the relation between EWA and weighted ctitious play is exact rather than approximate.
The contrast with EWA makes clear that belief models actually make three separate assumptions: Players' initial attractions are expected payo s based on some prior; players update attractions using EWA with = 1; and attractions are a weighted average of lagged attractions and payo s = . We think the most intuitively appealing assumption is the best-responsiveness to foregone payo s embodied in = 1, rather than the weighted-average restriction = or the restriction on rst-period play. EWA allows one to separate the three features of belief learning: Players could have attractions which begin and grow di erently than belief models assume, but update those attractions in a belief-learning way. Such players are a special kind of EWA learner.
The nonlinear interplay of parameters in the EWA updating rules is why, as a model of human learning, EWA is potentially superior to simply running a regression of choices against reinforcements and expected payo s or combining the two i n a w eighted average. Reinforcements and expected payo s di er in three crucial dimensions initial attractions and experience weight N0, the weight on foregone payo s in updating attractions, and whether attractions can grow outside the bounds of possible payo s which depends on and . EWA is not a convex combination of reinforcement and belief models because these three dimensions are controlled by separate parameters. That is, a weighted average in which expected payo s are given weight and reinforcements have weight 1 , will update attractions like EWA does, but that weighted average will not allow the wide range of initial attractions, experience rates, and growth rates available in EWA. 6 
Choice probabilities
Attractions must determine probabilities of choosing strategies in some way. P j i t should be monotonically increasing in A j i t and decreasing in A k i t where k 6 = j. The parameter measures sensitivity of players to attractions. Sensitivity could vary due to the psychophysics of perception or whether subjects are highly motivated or not. In this probability function, the exponent in the numerator is just the weighted e ect of strategy j's attraction, A j i t, on the probability of choosing strategy j. Models in which cross-e ects of attractions on other strategies' choice probabilities are allowed have been estimated Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1997 but we do not have the degrees of freedom to do so. 7 The logit, power, and probit probability functions each have advantages and disadvantages. The exponential form has been used to study learning in games by M o o k erjhee and Sopher 1994, 1997, Ho and Weigelt 1996, and Fudenberg and Levine in press, and in`quantal response equilibrium' models by Chen, Friedman and Thisse in press and McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1996. Cheung and Friedman 1997 used the probit form. The exponential form is are invariant to adding a constant to all attractions. 8 As a result, negative v alues of A j i 0 are permissible, which means one can avoid the di cult question of how to update attractions when payo s are negative. 9 The power probability form is given by
The power form is invariant to multiplying all attractions by a constant. Because of this invariance, the parameters N0 and make no di erence when the power form is used i.e., they are not identi ed. 10 Depending on one's purpose, being able to ignore N0 and can be an advantage or disadvantage. For the purpose of distinguishing di erent models, it is a big disadvantage because models impose di erent restrictions on N0 and . By using the power form, 7 In Mookerjhee and Sopher 1997, the exponent in the probability equation numerator is the sum of weighted e ects of all the attractions, P mi k=1 jk A k i t, where jk is the cross-e ect of strategy k's attraction on strategy j's score. This model allows cross-e ects in which one strategy's attraction can a ect other strategies' choice probabilities di erently. These cross-e ects are hard to interpret without knowing more about similarity o f strategies or some other basis for one strategy's attraction to a ect others di erently. Nonetheless, they have some signi cance as a whole in the Mookerjhee-Sopher analysis of constant-sum games. Estimating them for our median-action and p-beauty contest data uses up far too many degrees of freedom because there are too many strategies. Including cross-e ects could proceed particularly e ciently if some structural considerations were used to restrict coe cients a priori as in Sarin and Vahid's, 1997, use of strategy similiarity. 8 As a result, one must normalize A j i 0 to equal a constant for one value of j in order to identify parameters. There is some evidence that adding a constant t o p a yo s does matter Bereby-Meyer and Erev, 1997 but there is also evidence that logit ts better than power, so we regard the choice of proper form as a matter of one's purpose and yet-unresolved empirical debate. 9 Borgers and Sarin 1996 avoid this problem by adding x to all other strategies when a chosen strategy loses x. 10 The parameter disappears because it only appears in the updating equation denominator Nt , 1 + 1 which is common to all attractions and thus cancels out in the power form. Then EWA attractions at time t depend only on recent p a yo s and the product A j i 0 N0 . While initial choice probabilities depend on A j i 0 only, these probabilities are the same as those that depend on A j i 0N0
for N0 0. As a result, multiplying the initial attractions by an arbitrary constant makes no di erence econometrically, N0 is not identi able.
the di erence between belief-based, reinforcement, and EWA models, besides initial attractions, is only one parameter, , rather than three parameters. For the purposes of estimating any one model reliably, h o wever, conserving degrees of freedom is good so the power form is better. Since our main purpose in this paper is comparing models, having the extra tools to distinguish theories is a large advantage so we use the logit form rather than the power form. This choice of probability rule is, of course, not an essential part of the EWA model.
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether the logit, probit or power forms t better adjusting for degrees of freedom. Previous studies show roughly equal ts of logit and power Tang, 1996; Chen and Tang 1996; Erev and Roth, 1997 or better ts for the logit form over the power form Camerer and Ho, 1998.
Interpreting EWA parameters
We think it is crucial to ask how a learning model's parameters can be interpreted, what general behavioral principles of learning they capture, and, for EWA, how it reveals assumptions implicit in reinforcement and belief learning. Asking these questions about any learning theory avoids the danger of adding parameters just to improve statistical t, without adding new insight or respecting what is known in other disciplines. In addition, if parameters have natural psychological interpretations they can bemeasured in other ways e.g., response times and attention measures and used in psychological modelling.
Learning principles and
The parameter measures the relative weight given to foregone payo s, compared to actual payo s, in updating attractions. This is the most important parameter in EWA because it shows most clearly the di erent w ays in which E W A, reinforcement and belief models capture two basic principles of learning the law of actual e ect and the law of simulated e ect.
Many decades of learning experiments, mostly with nonhuman animal subjects, show that successful chosen strategies are subsequently chosen more often. Behaviorist psychologists call this the`law of e ect' Thorndike, 1911; Herrnstein, 1970. We relabelthis the`law of actual e ect' because behaviorists took it for granted for years that the only e ect on subsequent choices was produced by rewards for actual choices. The behaviorists eschewed`mentalist' constructs like imagination, which allowed the possibility that foregone rewards could a ect the probability o f c hoosing new strategies, until a series of demonstrations showed that those cognitive constructs are necessary. When applied to humans playing games with a known payo matrix, it is sensible to propose a corollary general principle, the`law of simulated e ect'. The law of simulated e ect states that unchosen strategies which w ould have yielded high payo s simulated successes are more likely to bechosen subsequently. Many experiments on reinforcement learning are consistent with this principle. 11 Furthermore, most research on human and machine learning assumes that the basic process driving learning is not reinforcement, perse, but the reduction of errors. Since errors are measured by the di erence between what players received and what they could have received, error-reduction algorithms use both actual payo s and foregone payo s too, obeying both the law of actual e ect and the law of simulated e ect.
The empirical strengths of the law of e ect and the law of simulated e ect are the key to distinguishing di erent models of learning in games, and are calibrated by . Reinforcement insists that only actual e ects matter =0. Belief models implicitly require that actual and simulated e ects are equally strong = 1. EWA takes the middle ground.
The parameter also can be seen as a way of endogenizing a reference point or aspiration level. Many studies show that the reinforcement value of a xed payo can vary, depending on what aspiration level the payo is compared to. Some reinforcement models build in an aspiration level directly, and adjust it across time based on observed payo s, which requires at least two free parameters an initial level and an adjustment rate. In EWA, reinforcing strategies according to foregone payo s means the probability of a chosen strategy s i t only increases if its payo is larger than times the average foregone payo see our working paper for details. Thus, a larger creates a more extreme aspiration level. EWA therefore creates an endogeneous, adjustable reference point at no extra parametric cost.
Growth of Attractions, and
The parameter depreciates past attractions, A j i t.
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The parameter depreciates the experience measure Nt. It captures decay in the strength of prior beliefs, which can be di erent than decay of early attraction captured by . These factors combine cognitive phenomena like forgetting with a deliberate tendency to discount old experience when the environment is changing.
One way t o i n terpret and is by considering the numerator and denominator of the main EWA updating equation 2.2 separately, and thinking about how reinforcement and belief-based models use these two terms di erently. The numerator is Nt,1A j i t, 1 + + 1 , Is j i ; s i t i s j i ; s ,i t. This term is a running total of depreciated attraction, updated by each period's payo s. The denominator is Nt , 1 + 1 . This term is a running total of depreciated periods of experience-equivalence. Reinforcement models essentially keep track of the running total in the numerator, and do not adjust for the number of periods of experience-equivalence since = 0, the denominator is always one. Belief-based models also keep track of the attraction total but divide by the total number of periods of experience-equivalence. By depreciating the two totals at the same rate = , the belief-based models keeps the`per-period' attractions expected payo s in a range bounded by the game's payo s.
EWA allows attractions to grow faster than an average, but slower than a cumulative total. An analogy might help illustrate. Instead of determining attractions of strategies, think about evaluating a person for example, an athlete, or a senior colleague you might hire based on a stream of lifetime performances. The reinforcement model evaluates people based on depreciated lifetime performance. The belief-based models evaluate people based on`average' depreciated performance. Both statistics are probably useful in evaluation in hiring a colleague or an athlete, you would want to know lifetime performance and some kind of performance averaged across experience. One way to mix the two is to normalize depreciated cumulative performance by depreciated experience, but depreciate the amount of experience more rapidly. Then if two people perform equally well on average every year, the person with 10 years of experience is rated somewhere between equally as goodand twice as goodas the person with ve years of experience. When , E W A models players who use something in between`lifetime' performance and`average' performance to evaluate strategies.
The depreciation rate parameters and can also be understood by h o w they control slowdown in learning rate or sharpness of convergence. Solving recursively for steadystate attraction levels shows that those levels equal the ratio 1, 1, times the steady-state average payo . Thus, when = 0 as in reinforcement learning, attractions can end up outside the bounds of payo levels and they grow as large as possible, holding constant. When = , as in belief-learning, steady-state attraction levels are equal to steady-state average payo s. The implication of these two possibilities depends on how attractions determine probabilities. In the logit probability form, only di erences in attraction levels a ect choice probabilities. Therefore, given a xed value of , attractions which can grow outside the bounds of payo levels have a wider range across strategies. This allows the possibility of sharper convergence in the sense that choice probabilities can converge closer to the boundaries at zero and one.
When attractions are bounded to beclose to payo levels, convergence cannot beas sharp. In the power probability form, only ratios of attraction levels matter. Therefore, if attractions grow the relative impact of new reinforcements falls; learning slows down. Ceteris paribus, reinforcement learning requires convergence to beas sharp as possible in the logit form or requires learning to slow d o wn as quickly as possible in the power form, while belief learning requires the opposite. EWA is able to choose an intermediate value of which tailors the sharpness of convergence or rate of learning to the data.
Initial attractions A j i 0 and their strength N0
The term A j i 0 represents the initial attraction, which might bederived from an analysis of the game, from surface similarity between strategies and strategies which were successful in similar games, etc. Belief models restrict the A j i 0 strongly by requiring initial attractions to be derived from prior beliefs. This requires, for example, that weakly dominated strategies will always have weakly lower initial attractions than dominant strategies. EWA allows more exibility.
For example, suppose players make rst-period choices randomly, by choosing what was chosen previously in a di erent game, by setting each strategy's initial attraction equal to its minimum payo the maximin rule or maximum payo the maximax rule 13 , or by choosing stochastically among selection principles like payo -dominance, risk-dominance, loss-avoidance, etc. All these decision rules are plausible models of rstperiod play, but none of them generate initial attractions which are always expected payo s given some prior beliefs.
We consider the scienti c problem of guring out how people choose their initial strategies as fundamentally di erent than explaining how they learn. Leaving initial attractions unrestricted makes them numerical placeholders which can be lled by a theory of rst-period play which supplies attractions as an input to EWA. That combination would beacomplete theory of behavior in games, from start to nish.
The initial-attraction weight N0 appears in the EWA model to allow players in belief-based models to have an initial prior which has a certain strength measured in units of actual experience. In EWA, N0 is therefore naturally interpreted as the 13 Making a strategy's initial attraction equal to its minimum payo , for example, is implicitly putting all the belief weight on the choices by others which yield that minimum. But the choices by others which lead to minima for di erent strategies are likely to be di erent. So the implicit beliefs underlying each attraction will be di erent. strength of initial attractions, relative to incremental changes in attractions due to actual experience and payo s. Fixing N0 = 1 means that, unit for unit, initial attractions A j i 0 and chunks of reinforcement from payo s are weighed equally when attractions are updated. This is easiest to see by xing = 1 for simplicity and directly computing the attraction after two periods, A j i 2, which gives A j i 2 = The parameter captures the declining weight placed on payo s from more distant periods of actual experience, compared to more recent periods. That is, the older period 1 p a yo i s j i ; s ,i 1 is weighted by but the recent period 2 payo i s j i ; s ,i 2 is not. Like previous payo s, the initial attraction is also weighted by a p o wer of 2 , because it happened' two periods earlier, but is also weighted by N0. Thus, the parameter N0 captures the special weight placed on the initial attractions, compared to increments in attraction due to payo s. N0 can therefore be thought of as a`pre-game introspective experience' weight. If N0 is small the e ect of the initial attractions is quickly displaced by experience. If N0 is large then the e ect of the initial attractions persists.
Notice that updating the experience-weight by Nt = Nt , 1 + 1 implies a steady-state value of N = 1 1, . In estimation, we have found it useful to restrict N0 to be less than N . This implies Nt , 1 Nt; the experience weight is weakly rising over time. Since the relative weight on decayed attractions, compared to recent reinforcement, is always increasing, the relative weight on observed payo s is always declining. This implies a`law of declining e ect' which is widely observed in research of learning.
The exibility of initial attractions and experience weight allows one to t a variety of models. Theories of equilibrium behavior are special cases in which all`learning' occurs before the game starts. For example, a`stubborn' game-theoretically-minded player sets A j i 0 equal to the equilibrium payo s of each strategy and act as if N0 is in nite meaning that no amount of game-playing experience can outweigh the prior calculation. An adaptive game theorist assumes A j i 0 are equilibrium payo s but has a small N0, so she learns from experience. A player who does not begin with prior beliefs, but updates according to experience as a belief learner does, has = and = 1 with arbitrary A j i 0.
Other features could conceivably be included. Players who tend to repeat previouslychosen strategies, regardless of their outcomes, reveal a`status quo bias' or`habit' Majure, 1995. Similarly, imitative learning is just acquiring somebody else's habit It is not clear how to add this feature to EWA because it presumes payo -independent reinforcement of chosen strategies.
4 Previous research
In this section we brie y summarize previous research see Camerer, in progress, for more details.
Several papers investigate only belief learning. Cheung and Friedman 1997 CF estimated a weighted ctitious play model on individual-level data from four games hawkdove, stag hunt,`buyer seller' and battle-of-the-sexes. They nd substantial heterogeneity across subjects but stability across games in the equivalents of and . A general belief model allowing idiosyncratic shocks in beliefs was developed by Crawford 1995 to t data from coordination games, extended by Broseta 1997 to allow ARCH error terms, and applied by Crawford and Broseta in press to coordination with preplay auctions. Brandts and Holt in press and Cooper, Kagel, and Garvin 1997 simulate ctitious play in signaling games. Boylan and El-Gamal 1992 compare ctitious play and Cournot learning in coordination and dominance-solvable games; they nd overwhelming relative support for ctitious play.
Other studies concentrate only on reinforcement learning. Versions of reinforcement in which probabilities were reinforced directly, or cumulative payo s normalized, were used by Bush These studies of belief and reinforcement learning nd that each approach, evaluated separately, has some explanatory power. Other studies compared models. 14 
Erev and
Roth 1997 add an adjustable reference point to their earlier model cf. Cross, 1983 . The extended model ts slightly better than ctitious play, at the individual level, in constant-sum games played for 100 or more periods. Mookerjhee and Sopher 1994,1997 MS compare average-payo reinforcement and ctitious play in constant-sum games; reinforcement does somewhat better. Ho and Weigelt 1996 compare modi ed versions of ctitious play and choice reinforcement the MS`vindication' model in coordination games with multiple Nash equilibria. Fictitious play ts better.
Many variants of weighted ctitious play and reinforcement and other models were compared by Tang 1996a,b in games with mixed-strategy equilibria. Reinforcement does better in most games. Chen and Tang 1996 t models to data from two public 14 In still another approach, models in which players learn to shift weight across various rules or methods', rather than across strategies, were studied by T ang and by Stahl 1996 Stahl , 1997 . In Tang's comparison`method-learning' does slightly worse than reinforcement. Stahl 1997 nds that players seem to weight rules which mimic choices of others or best-respond given di use priors. goods games. In one game equilibration is so fast that Nash equilibrium outpredicts the learning models. In the other game reinforcement does better.
The overall picture from previous research is somewhat blurry. Comparisons appears to favor reinforcement over belief learning in constant-sum games but speci cations of the models, estimation techniques, and games vary across studies. Our approach allows one to compare models more systematically by including features which have been used di erently in di erent studies. Two general features are notable.
First, most papers assume equal initial attractions or, for belief models, uniform priors. Some papers estimate initial attractions using rst-period data which does not generally optimize overall t. Our procedure is more general because we estimate initial attractions and experience weight as part of an overall maximization of t. Estimating initial experience weight N0 allows belief models to express a prior strength. This is an important feature of belief learning; omitting it may explain why belief models have sometimes t relatively poorly in Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1997; Tang, 1996a; Chen and Tang, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1997.
Second, some reinforcement models assume averaged-payo s a ect choices, while others assume reinforcements cumulate. This di erence can be captured by allowing to vary between for averaging and 0 for maximum cumulation, as EWA does. In addition, some studies of belief learning did not allow weighted ctitious play, as EWA does. Including and therefore allows us to determine whether previous mixed results depend on whether reinforcements are averaged or cumulated, and on whether belief models are weighted.
Our methodology for model estimation is more general than most earlier papers in four ways. First, we compare across three classes of games using the same estimation technique only Cheung and Friedman 1997 have done this in one paper. Second, our method uses standard statistical tests to judge whether di erences in t are due to chance, or put di erently, to decide whether simple models are too simple or not. Only Stahl 1996, 1997 compared models using tests which correct for the numberof free parameters. Third, we calibrate models on the rst 70 of the periods in each sample and predict the rest of the sample to validate the estimates and avoid over tting no previous paper has done this. Fourth, we allow heterogeneity across individuals by comparing a model with a single class of agents with a two-segment model, which has not been done before. 15 15 The only paper which estimates individual-level parameters on these kinds of models is Cheung and Friedman 1997. While the median parameter estimates are reasonable and similar across games when expected to be, the individual-level estimates are variable e.g., a third of the estimates are negative and a sixth are above one. This re ects some imprecision in individual-level estimation which suggests that multiple-segment estimation, which lies between single-segment estimation and individual-level estimation may be a reasonably parsimonious compromise between the desires to allow heterogeneity and to estimate reliably. 16 5
Estimation Strategy
We estimated the values of model parameters from three samples of experimental data 16 and validate the models by predicting behavior out of sample. The games are: Constantsum games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria and one weakly dominated strategy; a`median-action' coordination with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria; and a dominancesolvable`p-beauty contest' game with a unique equilibrium. We chose these games for several reasons.
First, the games have a range of di erent structural features as in Cheung and Friedman 1997 and Stahl 1997. This avoids the possible mistake of concluding that a model generally ts well because it happens to t one class of games.
Second, the games have di erent spans the constant-sum games last 40 periods and the others last 10 periods. Longer spans provide more data and more power for estimating individual di erences. But a mixture of long and short spans are valuable too, because some games like the coordination and beauty contest games reported below converge fairly rapidly. Learning models should be able to explain why convergence is fast in those games and slow in others.
Third, most previous studies have reported results which are favorable to either reinforcement or belief learning. The games we use each present some new challenges to these models. The presence of dominated strategies in the constant-sum games is a challenge for belief models, which predict those strategies will be played relatively rarely. Rapid convergence in the coordination and dominance-solvable games is a challenge for reinforcement learning see also Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin, 1997.
Next we describe some general features of the estimation method. For simplicity we assume that players' strategies are the stage-game strategies, and denote player i's strategy choice in period t by s i t. Of course, in general strategies could be historydependent or be decision rules.
We use a`latent class' approach in which there are one or two segments of players, and all players in a segment are assumed to have the same parameter values. This technique is standard in some elds e.g., analyses of brand choice in marketing and was also suggested by Crawford 1995. 17 The single-class estimation provides a representative-agent 16 Our working paper includes two other samples of data, on weak-link coordination games and matching pennies Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1994. We dropped these because the weak-link results did not have a long enough span to permit both calibration and validation; calibration is reported in Camerer and Ho, 1997. The matching pennies data did not distinguish models from each other or from Nash equilibrium.
benchmark. Allowing a second class gives a clue about how important it is to allow heterogeneity. For example, our results show that in constant-sum games allowing a second class hardly improves the t at all while t is improved substantially in coordination games.
The two-class procedure makes sense because in these data sets there are not enough observations persubject to reliably estimate many more classes. 18 And while including more segments would bedesirable, assuming all players have the same parameters does not impose a heavier penalty for some models than for others, so it is unlikely that the two-class assumption will lead us to incorrectly favor one model over another.
We estimate initial attractions A j 0 suppressing the player subscript. Assuming equal initial attractions or equal priors in belief models saves degrees of freedom but ts poorly in our data. Estimating initial attractions also creates numbers which m a y b e useful for constructing a good theory of rst-period play. Keep in mind that in the exponential form, attractions are only identi ed up to a constant, so we m ust x one of the A j 0 to equal a constant. We searched over parameter values to maximize the LL function using the MAXLIK routine in GAUSS, which uses a gradient method. To avoid converging to local optima we tried a variety of starting points. We restricted ; to be positive, 0 ; 1.
In order to make the value of N0 interpretable as a weight on initial attractions relative to reinforcing payo s, we restricted the range of A j 0 to beless than or equal to the di erence between the minimum and maximum payo s while also setting one 18 Two segments are also useful because one can then compare a two-segment EWA model with a two-segment model in which one segment are reinforcement learners and the other segment are belief learners. We did this in Camerer and Ho 1998 on weak-link and median-action data and EWA ts much better than the mixture model. of the attractions equal to zero for identi ability. 19 Since this restriction is naturally satis ed in belief models, in order to compare EWA to belief and reinforcement learning we imposed it in EWA and reinforcement as well. 20 We also restricted 0 N0 1 1, to guarantee that the weights Nt rise over time.
Standard errors of parameters were estimated using a jackknife procedure. In each run of the jackknife, one subject was excluded from the analysis and the model was estimated using all remaining subjects. 21 Doing this sequentially produces N vectors of estimates where N is the numberof subjects. The parameter standard errors are then the standard deviations of parameter estimates across the N runs. Correlations between parameters can also becomputed this way, and help detect identi cation problems.
Since EWA i s a l w ays more general than the special cases, it will necessarily t the data better so there is some danger of over tting. To guard against this, we both calibrate the models and validate them, by deriving MLE estimates using the rst 70 of the observations in each sample, then using these estimates to predict the path of play i n t h e remaining 30 of the sample. This procedure uses enough data to estimate parameters reliably, but also forecasts out-of-sample to ensure models are not being over t. To evaluate model accuracy in the calibration phase, we report four criteria: Log likelihoods, Akaike and Bayesian information criteria which penalize theories according to the number of free parameters, 22 and a pseudo-R Note that this MSD does not average observations across individuals. Model ts are also compared to a random choice model in which all strategies are chosen equally often in each period. We do not compare results with Nash equilibrium because it does very poorly in constant sum games and beauty-contest games in which iteratively-dominated strategies predicted to have zero probability are often played and does not exclude any choices in the coordination games. 19 If the attractions are not restricted in this way, then the experience weight N0 expresses both the relative w eight on initial attractions and payo s, and a scaling factor which puts attractions and payo s on the same scale. By restricting attractions to have the same range as payo s, we can then interpret N0 as a relative w eight. 20 In our working paper we allowed initial attractions to have arbitrary scale, which made MLE convergence slower and identi cation worse. Allowing arbitrary attractions helps reinforcement a bit in constant-sum games but does not help much in median-action and beauty-contest games. 21 For the constant-sum games, with only twenty subjects per game, every pair of row and column players were excluded, giving 100 jackknife runs. 22 The Akaike criterion AIC is LL , k and the Bayesian criterion BIC is LL , k 2 logM where k is the number of degrees of freedom and M is the size of the calibration sample. 23 The measure 2 is the di erence between the Akaike measure and the log likelihood of a model of random choices, normalized by the random-model log likelihood.
For each game, we describe the game and basic details of how the experiments were conducted. Then we compare models and discuss parameter estimates. , the best t statistic is printed in italics and marked with an asterisk. In both the calibration and validation phases, EWA ts substantially better in four of six games; in two cases the belief models t a little better. If EWA was over tting, it would do relatively better in calibration than in validation, but this isn't the case. Belief models do better than reinforcement in constant-sum games and worse in the medianaction game. In the beauty contest game, the belief model does worse than reinforcement during calibration and better during validation. The two-segment models generally t a little better during both validation and calibration, but the improvement in t over one-segment models is small. |||||||||||||| Table 1 about here ||||||||||||||
Constant-sum games with dominated actions
We t data from four constant-sum games: two are 4x4 G1 and G3 and the other are 6x6 G2 and G4 from Mookherjee and Sopher 1997. Tables 2a-2b show the payo matrices. 24 The 4x4 games essentially collapse three of the undominated actions actions 3-5 of the 6x6 games into a single action action 3. |||||||||||||| Tables 2a-b about here |||||||||||||| Note that these games each have a w eakly dominated action action 4 in G1 and G3 and 6 in G2 and G4. Dominated actions are useful for model discrimination because belief-based models always predict these actions will bechosen weakly less frequently than dominant actions, whereas the arbitrary initial attractions allowed by EWA and choice reinforcement can allow frequent choices of dominated strategies.
All these games have a unique mixed strategy equilibrium which is symmetric even though the games are not symmetric. In games G1 and G3, in equilibrium actions 1-4 are played with probabilities ; 0 respectively. In games G2 and G4, equilibrium proportions are Each game was played by 10 di erent pairs of subjects playing with the same partner 24 The fractional payo s e.g., 2 3W, denote probabilistic chances of winning W. These present a complication for reinforcement models, including EWA do you reinforce the actual payo which has a one-third chance of being zero if 2 3W is the payo or the expected payo ? We reinforce according to the expected payo . 20 40 times. At the end of each period players were told their partner's choice and their own payo . In games G1 and G2 a win paid 5 rupees; in games G3 and G4 the payo s were doubled to 10 rupees. A typical student's monthly room and board cost 600 rupees.
We derived MLE parameter estimates using the rst 28 periods, and validated by predicting the last 12 periods. Because the payo matrix is not symmetric even though the equilibrium mixed-strategy proportions are, we estimate separate initial attractions A j i 0 and separate initial experience-weights N j i 0 for row and column players though we restrict the total experience weight N0 to bethe same for both types of players. Tables 3a-b show the MLE parameter estimates of the models, and 2 tests of the belief and reinforcement restrictions along with p-values and degrees of freedom. We report only the one-segment results because the two-segment results do not improve much and o er no special insights.
Tables 3a-b shows that for one-segment models, belief-based models and choice reinforcement restrictions are weakly and strongly rejected by 2 tests, respectively, in the calibration phase. In the validation phase, the reinforcement model is worst. The belief model is better than EWA in the four-strategy games G1 and G3, and worse in the sixstrategy games G2 and G4. These di erences are not large, however, and seem to be due to an idiosyncracy in game G1. 25 Tables 3a-b about here   ||||||||||||||   Tables 3a-b report parameter estimates and jackknifed standard errors. The initial conditionsÂ j 0 are encouragingly similar in pairs of low-and high-stakes games G1-G3 and G2-G4, and put low initial attraction on the dominated strategies. The initial experience weightN0 varies between about 10-20 and is close to its steady-state value of 1 1, . This means that initial reinforcements do not have m uch e ect, which is reasonable given the slow convergence in these 40-period games. The decay parameters^ and^ are close to one, with^ ^ . These numbers imply that attractions grow only slightly on average. By forcing = 0, in contrast, the reinforcement model forces attractions to grow and`locks in' initial behavior too quickly. Finally,^ is between .4 and .7 and signi cantly di erent from both zero and one, except in game G1 where it is estimated to be zero.
||||||||||||||
Notice how the EWA estimates re ect a hybridization of elements of reinforcement and belief learning. First, the initial EWA attractions place much less relative w eight o n the dominated strategies the highest-numbered strategies 4 or 6 than the corresponding expected payo s in belief models. In the belief model the gap between the initial expected 25 In game G1, EWA o ver ts the rst 28 periods because it detects some upward trend in strategies S1 and S3, and a downward trend in S2. These trends are reversed in the last 12 periods so EWA predicts poorly there. The belief model estimates di erences in initial expected payo s but has a huge value of N0 = 300, so it doesn't predict much m o vement at all. payo s of strategy 2 the dominant strategies and the dominated strategies cannot be too large because the strategies are only weakly dominated. For example, in game G1 the estimated EWA attractions on row strategies 2 and 4 are 1.14 and .00, while the corresponding estimated expected payo s are 1.42 and .95, a gap less than half as large. Thus, EWA exploits the exibility of initial attractions from reinforcement models to squash the likelihood of playing weakly dominated strategies further down than belief models can. Second, EWA borrows the belief-model property that attractions do not grow m uch, since^ and^ are very close. Third, the estimates of around .5 except G1 re ect both the law of simulated e ect 0 and stronger e ects of actual payo s than foregone payo s 1.
Our conclusions about the relative performance of reinforcement and belief models are di erent from the ndings of Mookerjhee and Sopher 1997, whose analysis di ered in a couple of important ways. 26 Their version of reinforcement used`average achieved earnings' rather than weighted cumulative earnings. The fact that^ was very close tô in the EWA estimates indicates that MS took the right tack b y using average earnings rather than cumulative earnings, because the cumulative-earnings assumption predicts a sharpness of convergence which is not evident in the data. However, their version of the belief model which uses time-averaged expected payo s does not begin with an initial pre-game experience count expressing prior beliefs. Our estimates of N0 range from 30 to 300, which means that the belief model does best when it starts with a strong prior and updates very little. Thus, the di erence between our results and theirs is primarily due to the fact that they use averaged reinforcements rather than cumulative ones which improves reinforcement relative to our method, and they did not allow strong prior beliefs which handicaps the belief model relative to our method.
Finally, notice that these constant-sum games do not distinguish models empirically very well. Coordination games, in which players converge quickly, may prove to be a better domain in which to distinguish theories.
Median-action games
We study median-action order statistic coordination games in which the group payo depends on the median of all players' actions. Table 4 shows the payo matrix. Players earn a payo which increases in the median, and decreases in the squared deviation from the median. The median-action games capture social situations in which conformity 26 Their analysis used logit estimation of strategy choices to judge whether choices depended more strongly on a player's own average past earnings a kind of choice reinforcement or on expected earnings based on opponent's past history ctitious play. They also compared models based on the entire previous history, w eighting all observations equally, with models based on a ve-period moving average.
The entire-history models t better. They allowed cross-e ects so that the attraction A j i t can a ect other strategies di erently, which is more general than our approach. 27 Camerer and Ho 1997 also report estimates from`weak-link' coordination games in which the group payo depends on the minimum. The parameter estimates are similar to those reported here for example,^ is .65 and N0 is around two.
pressures induce people to behave like others do, but everyone prefers the group to choose a high median.
These median-action games were rst studied experimentally by V an Huyck, Battalio and Beil VHBB,1991, whose data we use. |||||||||||||| Table 4 about here
||||||||||||||
We estimate EWA, choice reinforcement, and belief models using sessions 1-6 from VHBB game . In their experiments groups of nine subjects each play ten periods together, so the sample has 54 subjects. 28 In each round players choose an integer from 1 to 7, inclusive. At the end of each round the median is announced but not the full distribution of choices and players compute their payo s. Since the groups are large, we assume that players form beliefs over the median of all players, ignoring their own in uence on the median and treating the group as a composite single player. Figure 1a shows the actual frequencies across the six sessions, pooled together. Initial choices are concentrated around 4-5, with a dip at 6 and small spikes at 3 and 7. Later choices move sharply toward the initial medians, which were always 4 or 5. A striking feature, which is masked by pooling sessions, is that the 10th-round median in every session was equal to the rst-round median. In three sessions the median began at 4 and stayed there; in the other three sessions the median began at 5 and stayed there.
From a learning point of view, median-action games are interesting because the penalty for deviating is fairly small if the players are close to equilibrium. Yet sharp convergence occurs within a couple of periods. Learning models which assume choices are reinforced must explain why players move quickly to equilibrium despite the large reinforcement if they are close to equilibrium and the small extra gain from moving precisely to equilibrium. The EWA model can account for this swift convergence if is close to one, which corresponds to the best-responsiveness inherent in belief learning.
|||||||||||||| Figure 1a about here |||||||||||||| Table 5 shows estimation results for the median-action games. First we focus on onesegment results. EWA ts better than the reinforcement model 2 = 64:8 and much better than the belief model 2 = 258:9. The sources of EWA's improved t are evident from looking at the data and plots of prediction errors. |||||||||||||| 28 They compared two treatments using nine-person groups and`dual market' dm treatments in which players play with a nine-person group and a twenty-seven person group simultaneously. There is no apparent or statistically-signi cant di erence between these treatments so we pool them together. Figure 1a shows that in the actual data, there are two large spikes in initial choices at 4-5, smaller spikes about 15 of the observations at 3 and 7, and few observations at 6. The estimated EWA initial attractions basically re ect this pattern in the data. The accuracy of the re ection can be judged from Figure 1b , an EWA error plot. This gure shows the di erence between MLE predicted frequencies of the EWA model and the actual frequencies. The largest error is that EWA underpredicts the frequency of choices o f 3 b y about .06; predictions of 6 and 7 are too high by .03 and .01.
Reinforcement and belief learning cannot t the initial conditions as well as EWA, but for di erent reasons. Reinforcement learning underpredicts the actual initial frequencies of 3 and 7 by about .08. Players who chose strategy 7 in the rst period quickly switch to lower numbers in period 2, as Figure 1a shows. The same is true for players who chose strategy 3, but this cannot beseen in Figure 1a . Reinforcement learning cannot predict how quickly this convergence occurs. Since the initial medians are 4-5, choices of 3 or 7 earn between $.55 and $.95, while ex-post best responses earn $1.00 to $1.10. Since the initial choices are positively reinforced, reinforcement learning cannot explain why subjects will abandon these strategies so quickly and switch in the direction of the observed median. EWA explains convergence with a high estimate of^ = :85. Since choice reinforcement does not adjust chosen strategies quickly enough, to maximize overall t it assumes the initial frequencies are close to frequencies in later periods, underpredicting choices of 3 and 7 and overpredicting 4-5. |||||||||||||| Figure 1c shows that the belief model underpredicts 3 and 7 also, but for a di erent reason. In the belief-based framework it is hard to explain why players would play 6 less than the play 5 or 7. The problem is that initial beliefs which give a high expected payo to 4-5 expecting a median of 4-5 also give an expected payo to 6 which is nearly as large, and larger than the expected payo to 7. Beliefs which give a large expected payo to 7, because there is large belief on a median of 7, will also give a high expected payo to 6. Thus, it is di cult to nd a single set of beliefs which can explain the spikes at 4-5 and 7, without also predicting a spike at 6. As a result, Table 5 shows that the one-segment model generates initial expected payo s which are higher for 6 $.78 than for 3 or 7 $.71 and $.60, so it overpredicts 6 and underpredicts 3 and 7 and also overpredicts 5.
Adding a second segment of players improves the belief-model t dramatically. As Table 5 shows, the log likelihood improves a lot the 2 statistics for the two-segment results compare one-and two-segment ts within each model. The two belief-model segments correspond naturally to a large 78 segment with high expected payo s for 4-5 generated by high initial beliefs in 4-5, and a smaller 22 segment with belief only in 7, which generates the highest expected payo for 7. While testing the restriction that the second segment does not improve t rejects strongly 2 = 119:0, the two-segment belief model still does not t as well as the one-or two-segment EWA model.
Besides tting initial conditions, a good learning model must explain why convergence in the rst couple of periods is fast and sharp. EWA does this by estimating a large value of .85 and^ much larger than^ , which allows attractions to grow rapidly so that choice probabilities move toward zero and one swiftly. The low value of N0, .65, also allows players to learn quickly from payo reinforcement relative to initial attractions.
The estimates show how EWA mixes and matches the best features of belief and reinforcement learning: It allows near-best response because is close to one as in belief models, explaining why players choosing near-equilibrium strategies move quickly toward equilibrium. But as in reinforcement, it can allow arbitrary initial attractions, which explains the relative paucity of choices of 6 in the rst period, and allows attractions to grow because = 0 to explain the sharpness of convergence. As a result, the EWA errors The results shown in the error plots are for one-segment models. Adding a second segment does improve ts signi cantly for all three models. In EWA, the main di erence in segments is that the larger segment with frequency 66 has an estimate^ = :95, very close to the belief restriction of one, while the smaller second segment has^ = :50. This corresponds to a segment of people with belief-type equal weighting of actual and foregone payo s, and another segment who weight actual payo s twice as heavily. Notice that these two segments do not particularly correspond to one segment of reinforcement learners and another segment of belief learners, so EWA is not simply capturing a mixture of these two special cases.
In reinforcement, the larger segment 80 has parameter values which are similar to those in the single segment, except the estimates of initial attractions for 3 and 7 are zero. The smaller second segment 20 is the opposite strategies 3 and 7 have the largest possible initial attractions and all the others are close to zero except that^ = 0. 29 This means the two-segment structure is trying to solve the problem of explaining rstperiod choices of 3 and 7 which are quickly extinguished by creating a second segment o f players who choose only 3 or 7 initially, then immediately decay their initial attraction. But adding this segment does not improve log likelihood much and the two-segment reinforcement model still ts worse than the one-segment EWA model.
The two-segment belief model improves t substantially, as noted above, but it still does not capture initial attractions exibly enough compared to EWA. We think the problem is that the belief model, as we de ne it, requires initial behavior to be consistent 29 The estimate of zero for is the full-sample MLE estimate. The jackknifed standard error of .235 means that in many jackknife samples is estimated to be positive. Indeed, the mean of the jackknife estimates is .18, but this does not substantially a ect the point w e make in the text.
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with prior beliefs and requires beliefs to beupdated using weighted ctitious play. The latter assumption boils down to = 1 and = . In games like the median-action game, the = 1 assumption may bereasonable but = does not allow sharp enough convergence. 30 More importantly, forcing initial attractions to spring from expected payo s does not exibly explain behavior of players who decision rules. For example, a player who randomizes among di erent selection principles will not necessarily choose according to expected payo s given a prior.
Dominance-solvable p-beauty contest games
In a p-beauty contest game, n players simultaneously choose numbers x i in some interval, say 0,100 . The average of their numbers x = P n i x i n is computed, which establishes a target number, , equal to p
x. The player whose numberis closest to the target wins a xed prize n and ties are broken randomly 31 .
P-beauty contest games were rst studied experimentally by Nagel 1995 and extended by Ho, Camerer and Weigelt in press and Du y and Nagel in press. These games are useful for estimating the number of steps of iterated dominance players use in reasoning through games. To illustrate, suppose p = :7. Since the target can never beabove 70, any numberchoice above 70 is stochastically dominated by simply picking 70. Similarly, players who obey dominance, and believe others do too, will pick n umbers below 4 9 s o c hoices in the interval 49,100 violate the conjunction of dominance and one step of iterated dominance. The unique Nash equilibrium is 0.
There are two behavioral regularities in beauty contest games see Nagel, in press, for a review. First, initial choices are widely dispersed and centered somewhere between the interval midpoint and the equilibrium. This basic result has been replicated with students on three continents and with several samples of sophisticated adults, including economics Ph.D.'s and a sample of CEOs and corporate presidents see Camerer, 1997 . Second, when the game is repeated, numbers gradually converge toward the equilibrium.
Explaining beauty contest convergence is a challenge for adaptive learning models. Standard choice reinforcement are likely to converge far too slowly, because only one player wins each period and the losers get no reinforcement. Belief models with low values of , which update beliefs very quickly, m a y track the learning process reasonably well, but earlier work suggests Cournot dynamics do not converge fast enough either Ho et al, in press. The three models were estimated on a subsample of data collected by Ho et. al in 30 The fact that^ = 0 in EWA and never varies across the jackknife runs also suggests that adding more segments to the belief model will not improve t substantially compared to EWA models with the same number of segments, because the belief models are always constrained to have = . 31 Formally, x i ; x ,i = nIxi;argminx j jxj, j P i Ixi;argminx j jxj, j where Ix; y is the indicator function that equals one if x = y and 0 otherwise.
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press. Subjects were 196 undergraduate students in computer science and engineering in Singapore. Each seven-person group of players played 10 times together twice, with di erent v alues of p in the two 10-period sequences. One sequence used p 1 and is not included below. The prize was .5 Singapore dollars perplayer each time, about $2.33 per group for seven-person groups. They were publicly told the target number and privately told their own payo i.e., whether they were closest or not.
We analyze a subsample of their data with p = :7 and :9, from groups of size 7. This subsample combines groups in a`high experience' condition the game is the second one subjects play, following a game with a value of p 1 and the`low experience' condition the game is the rst they play. The experience conditions were pooled to create enough data to get reliable estimates.
Several design choices were necessary to implement the model. The subjects chose integers in the interval 0,100 , a total of 101 strategies. If we allow 101 possible values of A j 0 we quickly use too many degrees of freedom estimating the initial attractions. Rather than imposing too many structural requirements on the distribution of A j 0, we assumed initial attractions were equal in ten-numberintervals 0,9 , 10, 19 , etc.
32
To implement E W A w e assumed subjects knew the winning number, w = argmin x j jx j , j , and neglect the e ect of their own choice on the target number. Implementing the belief model is not straightforward because subjects were told only the target number, and whether they won, so they do not have enough information to form beliefs about what other subjects will do, and use these updated beliefs to calculate expected payo s. Reinforcing numbers in some intervals, as in the EWA updating, will not necessarily correspond to belief learning based in information about all others' numbers which they do not know anyway. As a result, we estimate a restricted form of EWA with belief-type parameters by setting = 1, = , estimating initial belief counts in the ten-numberintervals, and taking initial expected payo s to be normalized belief counts multiplied by the prize. Numbers in the winning interval , d; + d are 32 In our working paper we assumed the distribution of the values of A j 0 came from a beta distribution but the basic results were not much di erent. We also tried tting asymmetric triangular distributions, values are only around 7. In the calibration sample, EWA is slightly better than reinforcement, which is better than the belief model. Out of sample, the belief model and EWA model are about equally goodand reinforcement is clearly worst; the belief model is slightly better on MSD and much worse in log likelihood than EWA. Table 6 reports results of parameter estimates. |||||||||||||| Table 6 about here |||||||||||||| The EWA model seems to be tting the data as best it can in an odd way: It assumes there is a general tendency to pick lower numbers which grows stronger over time. This can be seen in the initial attractions, which are largest for the lowest numberintervals Choice reinforcement uses the same ingredients high initial attractions for lower numbers, in ated by^ = 1 :38 but ts substantially worse because N0 is forced to be one and there is little reinforcement from direct payo s since most players lose and get nothing. The belief model, in contrast, ts best by assuming initial expected payo s are highest for choices in the interval 40,49 , responding to payo experience strongly is xed at one, and decaying attractions fairly quickly N 0 = 1:67 and^ = :40.
The two-segment analysis of EWA improves calibration substantially, compared to the one-segment model, and improves on the validation log-likelihood modestly. The twosegment reinforcement and belief models add very little to t, especially in validation.
The two EWA segments that emerge not reported in Table 6 are interesting. The larger segment 66 is very much like the one-segment E W A estimate: Estimated initial attractions increase for smaller-numberintervals,^ is 1.61,^ is zero, and the experience weightN 0 is 16.83. The smaller segment 34 is remarkably like the one-segment belief model estimate: Initial attractions are highest for choices in the middle interval 50,59 ,^ and^ are small and very close .50 and .43,^ is estimated to be 1.0, and N0 = 1:76. 34 The exception is that attractions are high for the interval 90,100 . This is to account for the occasional outlying choices of 100, which are discussed at length in Ho et al in press. None of these models capture the nature of learning well. The reinforcement and one-segment EWA models simply pretend that the rst period is like later periods and in ate initial attractions to gradually reproduce the latter-period data. Belief models converge too slowly. The problem is that all these models are adaptive, so they only use information about previous payo s including previous foregone payo s. Adaptive models of this sort cannot account for learning when players sophisticatedly realize that other players are learning as well cf. Milgrom and Roberts, 1991. Our earlier work Ho et al, in press showed that a fraction of players seem to`iteratively best-respond' in the sense that they choose numbers which are not best responses to observed history as in weighted ctitious play, but instead choose numbers which are best responses to anticipated best-responding by others. Because the belief and reinforcement models do not have this kind of sophistication, the hybrid EWA does not either. The main lesson from tting the beauty-contest data is that more work is left to bedone, by including sophistication in some parsimonious way.
Identi cation of parameters and model diagnostics
The results generally show that EWA ts better than either of the special cases, both adjusting for extra parameters and predicting out of sample. A further test for model speci cation is to ask whether there are regular corelations among the three added parameters, , N0, and , and other parameters. Because the EWA model is highly nonlinear, it is possible that certain parameters covary so closely that it is di cult to identify them econometrically. By de nition, a nonidenti ed parameter could be dropped from the model without reducing t. It is easy to show algebraically that the parameters are identi ed, in the sense that for arbitrary data sets and MLE parameter estimates, no other vector of parameter values which t equally well. However, it is possible that parameters are nearly non-identi ed in some data sets.
An easy way to check the severity of nonidenti ability is to compute correlations among parameter estimates across jackknife runs. Two parameters which cannot be disentangled will beperfectly correlated across runs. Low or modest correlations across runs indicate that parameters have detectably separate in uences. By inspecting the intercorrelations of the three important added parameters we can check whether each parameter contributes to predictive power.
Agoodoverall statistic is the mean absolute correlation of the estimates of a parameter with all the other parameters with which it might be misidenti ed. We exclude initial attractions and compute correlations among ; ; ; N 0, and .
For the mean absolute correlation with the other parameters is .31, .39, and .23 across the constant-sum, median-action, and beauty-contest games. None of the correlations with a speci c parameter are consistent in magnitude and sign across games. This indicates that is well-identi ed. The same statistics for N0 are .19, .22, and .32. The latter number excludes the correlation between N0 and in the beauty-contest game, which is nearly one because the declining-e ect constraint is binding. 35 These gures show that N0 is well-identi ed too except when the constraint binds. The mean absolute correlations for are .48, .30, and .32 the latter again excludes the high correlation with N0. These correlations are somewhat higher than for and N0, especially in constant-sum games, indicating possible identi cation problems. The most systematic large correlation is between and , which have an average correlation of .88 in the constant-sum games, and the correlations are nearly equal in all four games. They are also correlated .50 in the median-action game and uncorrelated -.03 in the beauty contest game. This pattern of correlations is a hint that the two depreciation parameters may befundamentally related, in some games, in a way we hope to explore in further research.
The fact that the intercorrelations among estimates are modest and unsystematic with noted exceptions con rm that the parameters added in EWA contribute separately to its t. We can also ask whether adding these parameters helps solve identi cation problems which arise in the belief and reinforcement special cases. For the reinforcement model, and are correlated -.79, -.68, and .05 in the three classes of games. The large negative correlations arise because when is lower attractions decay more rapidly, so must be larger to magnify small di erences in attractions into large di erences in choice probabilities. The same e ect does not seem to happen across runs of the beauty-contest game, where^ is 1.38 and none of the models captures learning well. Therefore, it is di cult to identify separate in uences of the two parameters. Adding and N0 in the EWA model reduces the correlations between and in magnitude, to .15, -.40, and -.20, eliminating any possible identi cation problem.
In the belief model the only apparent identi cation problem is between N0 and , which are correlated .20, -.86 and .99 in the three games. When is included in the EWA model, these correlations become .23, .31, and .99, so the identi cation problem is partly eliminated.
Overall, there are modest identi cation problems in all three models. Problems in the reinforcement and belief models are largely alleviated by introducing , N0, and in EWA. These new parameters are fairly well identi ed, except for modest-to-strong correlation between and in two of three games. EWA therefore solves minor identi cation problems in the simpler models at the expense of creating another minor one, which could beexplored in further research. 35 When the declining-e ect constraint N0 1 1, is binding N0 and are not identi ed separately.
The same is true in the belief model. We regard this as a shred of evidence about the way in which parameters may v ary systematically across classes of games see Cheung and Friedman, 1997. It may be that dominance-solvable games in which observed strategy choices are constantly shifting location have this general property so the restriction N0 = 1 1, can be safely imposed. 30 6 Discussion and conclusion
We proposed a general`experience-weighted attraction' EWA learning model in which the probability o f c hoosing a strategy is determined by its relative attraction. A strategy's attractions are updated by weighting lagged attractions by the number of periods of experience-equivalence' they contain, adding the payo s actually received or a fraction of the payo s that would have been received, then normalizing by an experience weight.
We see the paper as making two basic contributions.
First, we show that belief learning is not fundamentally di erent from reinforcement learning; both are special examples of one general learning rule EWA. By showing their common basis, EWA l a ys bare the essential components of reinforcement and belief learning, and shows how those components can becombined to make a better model.
Comparing choice reinforcement to EWA makes it clear that reinforcement assumes players ignore foregone payo s, and attractions cumulate as quickly as possible. Comparing weighted ctitious play to EWA makes it clear that belief models assume initial attractions are consistent with prior beliefs, foregone and actual payo s are equally reinforcing, and attractions are weighted averages of past attractions and payo s.
Second, by estimating the more general EWA model, along with reinforcement and belief-learning restrictions, our study combines methodological strengths of earlier studies while avoiding weaknesses. All earlier studies did one or more of the following: Concentrated on only one or two models, focussed on one class of games, ignored player heterogeneity, restricted the generality of models, derived parameter values using methods which do not guarantee best-ts, or did not report inferential statistics testing relative t. Our paper had none of these limits because we compared three general models, on three classes of games, allowed some heterogeneity, derived parameter values optimally, and reported both test statistics adjusting for free parameters three ways and out-of-sample predictive accuracy.
EWA ts better than the reinforcement models in all cases, and better than beliefs in most cases, both adjusting for degrees of freedom within-sample and in out-of-sample prediction. Belief models are more accurate than reinforcement in some games, and by some measures, and less accurate in others.
Because reinforcement and belief approaches place clear restrictions on parameter values, it is useful to describe speci c ndings by parameter estimates.
The foregone payo weight is estimated to be .42 averaging across the four constantsum games .85 in median-action games, and .23 in beauty contests. The raw average of these numbers, .50, suggests that players generally weight foregone payo s about half as much as actual payo s. This result incorporates the intuitions underlying both reinforcement actual payo s are stronger and belief learning foregone payo s matter.
Put di erently, players seem to obey both the law of actual e ect and a corollary law o f simulated e ect.
In the three games, the decay parameters and average 1.00 and .94, .80 and 0, and 1.33 and .94. The rst two games indicate that sometimes attractions seem to be approximately averages as in belief models and other times they seem to cumulate as rapidly as possible as in reinforcement. The value of above one in beauty contests, as discussed above, re ects a likely misspeci cation because the adaptive EWA model does not incorporate sophistication and hence learns too slowly a shortcoming the belief and reinforcement models also share.
The initial experience weight N0 averages 15.80, .65 and 16.82. The large values in constant-sum and beauty-contest games imply that players learn slowly, because they give much more weight to lagged attractions than to payo s. The low value of .65 in median-action games means players respond more strongly to payo s, learning faster.
EWA also exploits the exibility of initial attractions shared by reinforcement models, compared to belief models in which initial attractions must be expected payo s based on some prior. This exibility is particularly helpful in the coordination games.
The results show h o w E W A is able to`gene-splice' the best features of belief and reinforcement learning while avoiding weaknesses. For example, in the median-action games players begin with dispersed choices that seem to re ect di erent selection principles, and converge quickly. Explaining this pattern well requires initial attractions which are exible and cumulate as in reinforcement, rather than belief-based initial attractions which are averages, but also requires players to respond strongly to foregone payo s as in belief learning.
The fact that parameter values vary widely across the data sets is not too surprising; other studies have found di erences in parameter estimates across games e.g., Chen and Tang, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1997 . Furthermore, the parameters capture di erent features of the data speed of learning and sharpness of convergence. Since these features are di erent across the games we consider, parameter values should di er. Nonetheless, our understanding of learning will not be complete until there is a theory of how parameter values depend on game structure and experimental conditions see Cheung and Friedman, 1997, for important progress. These estimates, and others', provide raw material for such theorizing.
EWA extensions
There are many directions for future research.
Theorizing about the kinds of equilibria EWA learning rules converge to would be extremely useful. Progress might bemade by restricting attention to special classes of EWA players e.g., those with equal to zero, or one in speci c classes of games.
An empirical direction for further research is measurement of model parameters using psychological methods. For example, if is interpreted as attention to foregone payo s from unchosen alternatives, then values of should correlate with direct measures of attention, such as the amount of time subject spend looking at di erent numbers in a payo matrix see Camerer et al, 1993 . In general, measuring attention to information provides a direct way to test theories which assume certain kinds of information are not used. 36 Or if N0 is the number of pregame`trials' a player simulates which form prior beliefs, then N0 should berelated to the ratio of initial response times to later-period response times.
EWA will also have to be upgraded to cope with three modelling challenges sophistication, imperfect payo information, and speci cation of strategies before it is generally applicable.
Incorporating sophistication is important because EWA players only use information about their opponents' past choices, ignoring information about payo s of others. Using this information in an expanded learning rule which incorporates sophistication could help explain data like those from the beauty-contest games. Iterating sophistication might also link sophisticated-EWA to equilibrium theories like quantal-response equilibrium.
Incorporating imperfect payo information is important because any general model should be able to explain learning in low-information environments, where players do not know everything about their own payo s, opponents' strategies, etc. EWA can obviously beapplied in these settings by xing = 0 which means EWA can apply to any environment choice reinforcement applies to. A more general approach would use imperfect information in some other way, rather than just giving it zero weight.
Incorporating a richer speci cation of strategies is important because stage-game strategies are not always the most natural candidates for the strategies which players learn about. For example, players may learn about history-dependent repeated-game strategies or a wide variety of decision rules like minimax, Nash equilibrium, or imitation; e.g., Stahl, 1997 . Once a set of richer strategies is speci ed, of course, EWA can still model learning about those strategies. The open question, therefore, is what rules to specify a priori, and how a model can winnow down a very large set of possible rules as quickly as humans probably do.
Adding these di cult extensions to EWA, and a theory of rst-period play to supply initial attractions, might e v entually create a uni ed way to predict how people play games in the lab and, eventually, how they play outside as well. 36 For example, choice reinforcement predicts that players do not use information other than their own payo history. Experiments which v ary the information subjects are given have shown this prediction is wrong Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1994; cf. Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin, 1996 . Direct measures of attention provide a more direct test: if players look at foregone payo s frequently, then reinforcement models have some explaining to do. Similarly, all adaptive models predict that players do not use information about others' payo s; looking at those payo s is evidence of sophistication. ii Rules e-2 and e-4 are satis ed by b-1 and b-2.
iii The key step is showing that the belief-updating rule b-2 and expected-payo rule b-3 for determining attraction are consistent with e-3. Assume = and = 1 . Then the EWA rule e-3 rule becomes A j i t = A j i t , 1 The proof works by substitution and algebra.
i Condition c-1 follows from e-1.
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ii Assume N0 = 1 and = 0 . Then by e-4, Nt = 1 for all t 1.
iii Assume = 0 . With ii, condition e-3 then becomes condition c-2:
A j i t = A j i t , 1 + Is j i ; s i t s i t; s ,i t 27
Hence, all three conditions c-1 to c-3 follow, so under these conditions A j i t = R j i t. QED
